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Bulletin 37 January 28, 1991 
At-Large Electoral Systems and Voting Rights 
By Sidney Hemsley 
So you want to adopt or continue an at-large election 
system where all the members of the governing body 
are elected from the municipality as a whole. Or, you 
want to adopt a combination district/at-large election 
system in which the majority of members of the 
governing body would be elected from districts and 
one or two would be elected at-large. Will either 
system survive a challenge on the ground that it 
discriminates against minority voters? 
Ar ell, yes and no. Local governments have successfully · 
'llllll!!'efended a tiny number of totally at-large systems 
and at least one combination district/ at-large system 
(by agreement of the parties). 
However, if the local government has a significant 
minority population and a less-than-pristine record 
of race relations, any at-large component of its electoral 
system is skating on thin ice. Besides, win or lose, the 
defense of such suits is horrendously expensive (if 
the city loses, it also pays the plaintiff's attorney's 
fees). 
If that answer is not particularly helpfulin individual 
municipalities, there is a good reason for it. The 
reason lies in the nebulous legal tests against which 
at-large and combination at-large/ district electoral 
systems are measured that have grown out of the 
history of the statutes and cases in this area. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1965 (Act) banned a large 
number of election practices considered by the Con­
gress to discriminate against minorities in violation 
• the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States 
•nstitution. These practices include literacy tests, 
educational or knowledge tests, moral character tests, 
and proof of qualifications through registered voters 
or other classes. A major amendment to the Act, 
passed in 1975, required many states and local 
governments to provide bilingual election forms, 
including ballots. 
Section 2 of the Act, which basically tracked the 
language of the Fifteenth Amendment, provided 
that: 
No voting qualification or prerequk 
site to voting, or standard, practice, 
or procedure shall be imposed or 
applied by any State or political sub­
division to deny or abridge the right 
of any citizen of the United States to 
vote on account of race or color, or in 
contravention of the guarantees set 
forth in section 4(f)(2). 
In applying Section 2, the federal courts disagreed on 
whether a Section 2 violation was triggered by election 
practices that were adopted with the intention to 
discriminate against minority groups or simply by 
the effect of the practice. 
The United States Supreme Court settled that dis­
agreement in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980). 
That case involved a challenge under the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution, 
and Section 2, of the at-large election system of the 
City of Mobile, Alabama. The city was governed by 
a commission consisting of three commissioners elected 
at-large. The commission was established in 1911, 
but no black had ever been elected under that system. 
continued on page 2 
In fact, until 1973 none had ever sought office. However, 
the Supreme Court turned aside the challenge on the 
grounds that the plaintiffs had not proved the elec­
tion system was a "purposeful device to further racial 
discrimination." Curiously enough, the Court rea­
soned that purposeful discrimination in establishing 
the system could not be proven because in 1911 
blacks in Alabama were, for all practical purposes, 
disenfranchised; therefore there was no need on the 
part of the City of Mobile to adopt an at-large system 
to discriminate against them. 
In response to Holden's requirement that proof of 
intentional discrimination was essential to an elec­
tion practice claim under both the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and 
Section 2, the Congress in 1982 amended Section 2 by 
writing into it an "effects test." The intent and effect 
of that amendment was to overturn the "intentional 
test" of Bolden under Section 2. In fact, the Senate 
Judiciary Report on the bill whether "a challenged 
practice or structure, prevents plaintiffs from having 
an equal opportunity to participate in the political 
process and to elect candidates of their choice" 
(emphasis is mine). 
As amended in 1982, Section 2. presently reads as 
follows: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting 
or standard, practice, or procedure shall be 
imposed or applied by any State or political 
subdivision in a manner which results in a 
denial or abridgement of the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote on account 
of race or color, or in contravention of the 
guarantees set forth in Section 1973b(f)(2) of 
this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this 
section. 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, 
based on the totality of circumstances. it is 
shown that the political process leading to 
nomination or election in the State or political 
subdivision are not equally open to participa­
tion by members of a class of citizens pro­
tected by subsection (a) of this section in that 
its members have less opportunity than other 
members of the electorate to participate in the 
political process and to elect representatives 
of their choice. The extent to which members 
of a protected class have been elected to office 
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in the State or political subdivision is one 
circumstance which may be considered; Pro­
vided, that nothing in this section establishem 
a right to have members of a protected cla. 
elected in numbers equal to their proportion 
in the population (emphasis is mine). 
At-large election systems, then, are not per se uncon­
stitutional or a violation of Section 2. They, like other 
election practices, stand or fall on a "totality of circum­
stances" test under Section 2. 
However, because intentional discrimination is still 
essential to the proof of a voting rights discrimination 
case under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend­
ments to the United States Constitution, and Section 
2 requires only that the effect of the election practice 
in question be discriminatory, the latter has become 
the primary vehicle for at-large elections system 
challenges. 
The only U.S. Supreme Court case that interprets the 
present Section 2 is the landmark case of Thornburg v. 
Gingles, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (1986). In striking down most 
of the redistricting plan of the North Carolina General 
Assembly on the grounds that it diluted the vote of 
black citizens in certain districts, the Court announci:A 
a three-pronged test for proving a minority votJll9" 
dilution claim under Section 2. A plaintiff must show 
that: 
1. The minority is sufficiently large and geographi­
cally compact enough to constitute a majority in 
a single-member district. 
2. The minority is politically cohesive. 
3. The majority votes sufficiently as a block to enable 
it-in the absence of special circumstances, such 
as an unopposed minority candidate -- usually to 
defeat the minority's preferred candidate. 
The Court went on to say that, "Stated succinctly, a 
bloc voting majority must usually be able to defeat 
candidates supported by a politically cohesive geo­
graphically insular minority group" (emphasis is 
mine). 
If a local government possessed no other information 
than the history of Section 2, it should be on notia 
that if it has a significant minority population • 
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identifiable pockets, an at-large election system or a 
combination district/at-large is automatically sus-• pect. 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, generally, 
and Section 2 of that Act, as amended after Bolden, in 
particular, express a clear intention on the part of 
Congress to snuff out any kind of election practice 
that operates to the detriment of minority groups. 
At-large provisions created or preserved in such 
cities after 1982 are invitations to legal trouble even if 
they were, or are, established with no discriminatory 
intent in mind. 
The reason it is difficult to answer the question of 
whether a proposed district/ at-large combination in 
a particular municipality would withstand challenge 
is that there are no simple rules or standards against 
which to measure any particular at-large or combina­
tion district/ at-large election system, either before its 
adoption or after it is challenged. 
Even the U.S. Supreme Court in Gingles could not 
agree on what kind of evidence will satisfy the proof 
of a violation of each prong of the three-pronged test. 
Under the "totality of circumstances" test, the 
•determinatio1\ .(lf whether .a system c.omplies. with 
Section 2, can require some incredibly complicated 
and expensive analysis. In theory, that should be the 
plaintiffs problem; in reality, it is usually municipalities 
that end up on the complicated, expensive defensive 
in most at-large cases. 
However, one ironclad rule can be observed in the at­
large electoral system cases: if under the old election 
system no blacks, or few blacks were ever elected to 
office, that system will not stand constitutional 
muster. The corollary is that if under a proposed 
election system it is likely that no backs, or few blacks 
will be elected to office, the system will not stand 
constitutional muster. 
Beyond that simple rule, a municipality's defensive 
problems are compounded by the Senate Judiciary 
Report's list of nine "objective" factors the Courts are 
to use in analyzing a Section 2 claim: 
1. The extent of any history of official discrimina­
tion in the state or political subdivision that touched 
the right of the members of the minority group to 
• register, to vote, or otherwise participate in the democratic process. 
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2. The extent to which voting in the elections of the 
state or political subdivision is racially polarized. 
3. The extent to which the state or political subdivision 
has used unusually large election districts, majority 
voter requirements, anti-single shot provisions, 
or other voting practices or procedures that may 
enhance the opportunity for discrimination against 
the minority group. 
4. If there is a candidate slating process, whether the 
members of the minority group have been denied 
access to that process. 
5. The extent to which members of the minority 
group in the state or political subdivision bear the 
effects of discrimination in such areas as educa­
tion, employment and health, which hinder their 
ability to participate effectively in the political 
process. 
6. Whether political campaigns have been charac­
terized by overt or subtle racial appeals. 
7. The extent to which members of a minority group 
have been elected to public office in the jurisdic­
tion. 
8. Whether there is a significant lack of responsive­
ness on the part of elected officials to the particu­
larized needs of the members of the minority 
group. 
9. Whether the policy underlying the state or politi­
cal subdivision's use of such voting qualification, 
prerequisites to voting. or standard, practice or 
procedure is tenuous. 
But that list of rules is not a comprehensive and 
exclusive one, and there is no requirement that any 
particular factors be proven, the Senate Judiciary 
Report continued. In other words, the "totality of 
circumstances" test permits the plaintiff to use the 
shotgun approach in his presentation of evidence of 
discriminatory effect. Any evidence or perceived 
evidence of discrimination in, as well as Qy, the city is 
allowed to be shot forth as evidence of election prac­
tices discrimination. 
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That list of rules has been used in one form or another 
by the courts in virtually all of the cases challenging 
at-large systems since Gingles. Many courts have 
gotten even into white-minority income compari­
sons as evidence of a lesser ability on the part of the 
latter to participate in the electoral process! 
For an outstanding and devastating example of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee rules applied in a 
Tennessee case, see Buchanan v. City of Jackson, 683 
F.Supp. 1515 (1988) in which the court developed a 
170 year history of discrimination against blacks in 
and by the City of Jackson. 
What the Gingles three-pronged test and the "factors" 
that go into an analysis of a Section 2 case mean is that 
how a case is actually analyzed is "judge's choice." 
As one prominent writer on the subject pointed out: 
Because the nine factors of the Senate 
Report remain relevant, and because 
of the presence of constitutional claims, 
proof in at-large election cases extends 
backward to the formation of a local 
government in the Nineteenth Cen­
tury, and extends forward to cover 
the fairness to minorities of evezy aspect 
of current government operations: 
hiring, housing, urban renewal and 
relocations, street improvements, 
school operations and curricula, and 
the provision of all government serv­
ices .. . (emphasis is mine). (Rhyne, 
William S., Preparing and Trying the 
At-Large Election Voting Rights Case). 
In other words, the at-large system analysis can 
become an as complicated and comprehensive look 
into the history of the municipality as the judge 
wants to make it, and the outcome can be totally 
unpredictable, depending upon which proof the judge 
wants to accept or ignore. 
Although at-large election systems are not per se 
unconstitutional or a violation of Section 2, there is a 
judicial bias against them. While some have been 
upheld, they have generally received rough treat­
ment in the courts, including in Jackson and Chat­
tanooga. 
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No matter what good arguments justify at-large 
systems, where there is a significant minority popu­
lation in identifiable pockets, they are viewed as a1* 
instrument which either dilutes, or have the hig1'9 
potential to dilute, the voting strength of minority 
groups. 
While Section 2 specifically says that "nothing in this 
section establishes a right to have members of a 
protected class elected in numbers equal to their 
proportion in the population;' arguably, cases brought 
under that section lead to roughly that result. 
The lengths to which the courts have gone to over­
turn local election practices clearly not designed with 
a discriminatory intent in mind and defensible on 
common sense grounds is seen in NAACP v. City of 
Statesville, 606 F. Supp. 569 (1985). In that case the 
parties agreed to a combination district/ at large system 
in which some of the district seats contained a major­
ity black voting age population. 
However, the city supported staggered two year 
terms, the plaintiffs non-staggered four year terms, 
for the at-large offices. The Court was asked to 
resolve that difference in a way that would lead to the . 
least diminution of minority voting power. ThA 
Court decided that the at-large seats would be fillei'l9" 
in non-staggered elections because that method per­
mitted single-shot voting and candidate support trade 
off agreements between white and black candidates. 
The terms of office would be for four years because 
the blacks were less economically able than whites to 
sustain the cost of more frequent elections. 
In theory, a redistricting scheme which incorporates 
one or two at-large seats would insure the election of 
members of the minority to office, thereby satisfying 
Section 2 and Gingles. But a careful reading of 
Section 2 and the Senate Judiciary Committee Report's 
nine rules lead the court's to ask two questions about 
minority representation under such a system: (1) 
Does it permit the minority group to elect minority 
officeholders? and (2) Does it provide the minority 
group political power? Minorities may be elected to 
office in "proper" number in satisfaction of Section 2 
and Gingles under a combination district\at-large 
election system, but conceivably find their political 
• 
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power diluted by the at-large office holders. The 
court will assure itself that both questions are answered 
111!!JJf; favor of the minority. Although Section 2 and 
..... ingles may have had in mind voting power as 
opposed to political power, the latter has become a 
major component of the "totality of circumstances" 
test. 
In fact, evidence of that can be seen in Buchanan v. City 
of Jackson, 683 F. Supp. 1537 (1988) in which the Court 
fashioned a remedy to the at-large election system it 
had found in violation of Section 2 in Buchanan v. City 
of Jackson, 683 F. Supp. 1515 (1988). A proposal by the 
City of Jackson called for a board of nine commission­
ers, six district commissioners to be elected from 
single member districts, and three administrative 
commissioners to be elected at-large. 
The three administrative commissioners were to be 
responsible for the administration of the City of 
Jackson in virtually .the same manner as was the old 
board of three commissioners struck down by the 
Court. The Court rejected that plan on the premise 
that the election of all the administrative commis­
sioners at-large would not remedy effects of past 
discrimination, which included, 
• . .. among other things, under em­
ployment of blacks as City employ­
ees, poorly maintained streets in black 
communities, and the total absence of 
blacks elected to City administrative 
positions or appointed to head any 
department. 
If there has been past discrimination on the part of the 
city, it is very easy for a court to find that any 
proposed system in which the majority voters can 
elect the controlling faction on the governing body 
perpetuates the effects of past discrimination. 
Assume that there are five members of the governing 
body, two elected from majority districts, two from 
minority districts, and one elected at-large. If the 
total number of the majority voting age population in 
the municipality exceeds the total number of the 
minority voting age population, the at-large member 
of the governing body would, given polarized vot­
ing, always be elected by the majority. In addition, he 
.Fil she would hold the swing vote on the governing 
WJ>dy. 
5 
On the whole, it is not worthwhile to defend an at­
large or even a district/at-large election system any 
place in Tennessee where there are significant iden­
tifiable pockets of blacks, unless the city in question 
has an immaculate history on discrimination. It is 
essential to remember that the issue here is not 
whether the municipality intended to discriminate, 
but whether there was and is discrimination. 
Several good Tennessee Attorney General's opinions 
and publications from various sources have been 
written on this subject. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
For further information on at large electoral systems 
and voting rights, contact Sid Hemsley, senior legal 
consultant in Knoxville (615) 974-0411, or your local 
MT AS municipalconsultant in Nashville at (615) 256-
8151; Knoxville at (615) 974-0411; or Jackson at (901) 
423-3710. 
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water management. 
MTAS Technical Bulletins are information briefs that provide a timely review of topics of interest to Tennessee 
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to others for $2 each. Contact MTAS for a list of recent Bulletins. 
M�nirip.il Tedinkal 
Ad�Kory Service 
Municipal Technical Advisory Service 
The University of Tennessee 
600 Henley Street 
Suite 120 
Knoxville, Tennessee 37996-4105 
The University of Tennessee does not discriminate on the basis of race, sex, 
color, religion, national origin, age, handicap, or veteran status In provision 
of educational opportunities or employment opportunllle1 and benefits. 
The University does not discriminate on the basts of sex or handicap In the 
education programs and activities which It operates, pursuant to the require­
ments of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92..JtB; and 
Section 504 of the Rehab!Utatlon Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93·112; respectively. This 
policy extends to both employment by and admission to the Univen1!ty. 
Inquiries com:emlngTitle IX and Section 504 should be directed to Ms. Mary 
H. Taylor, Assistant to the Vice President, 109 Student Services Building, 
Knoxvllle, Tennes.see 37996-0212, (615) 974-6622. Charges of violatlon of the 
above policy should also be directed to Ms. Taylor. 
Authorization Numbet E14-1050-00-001·91 
• 
• 
